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Abstract
The following properties of the core of a one to one matching problem are
well known i the core is non empty ii the core is a lattice and iii the set
of unmatched agents is identical for any two matchings belonging to the core
The literature on two sided matching focuses almost exclusively on the core
and studies extensively its properties Our main result is the following char 
acterization of von Neumann Morgenstern stable sets in one to one matching
problems We show that a set of matchings is a stable set of a one to one
matching problem only if it is a maximal set satisfying the following proper 
ties a the core is a subset of the set b the set is a lattice and c the
set of unmatched agents is identical for any two matchings belonging to the
set Furthermore a set is a stable set if it is the unique maximal set satisfying
properties a b and c We also show that our main result does not extend
from one to one matching problems to many to one matching problems
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 J		
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  Introduction
Von Neumann and Morgenstern   introduced the notion of a stable set of a
cooperative game
 
The idea behind a stable set is the following  Myerson 
Osborne and Rubinstein  suppose the players consider a certain set of allo	
cations of the cooperative game to be the possible outcomes  or proposals of the
game without knowing which one will be ultimately chosen Then any stable set of
the game is a set of possible outcomes having the following properties  i for any
allocation in the stable set there does not exist any coalition which prefers a certain
other possible  attainable outcome to this allocation ie no coalition has a credible
objection to any stable outcome and  ii for any allocation outside of the stable set
there exists a coalition which prefers a certain other possible  attainable outcome to
this allocation ie any unstable outcome is credibly objected by a coalition through
a stable outcome Conditions  i and  ii are robustness conditions of stable sets
 i is referred to as internal stability of a set and  ii as external stability of a set
The core of a cooperative game is always internally stable but it may violate external
stability
Von Neumann and Morgenstern believed that stable sets should be the main
solution concept for cooperative games in economic environments Unfortunately
there is no general theory for stable sets The theory has been prevented from being
successful because it is very di
cult working with it which Aumann   explains
as follows Finding stable sets involves a new tour de force of mathematical reasoning
for each game or class of games that is considered Other than a small number of
elementary truisms  eg that the core is contained in every stable set there is no
theory no tools certainly no algorithms
These facts helped the core to become the dominant multi	valued solution concept
of cooperative games The core of a game is extensively studied and well understood
 
Stable sets are called  solutions in their book We follow the convention of most of the recent
literature and refer to  solutions as stable sets

by the literature  This led a number of papers to identify classes of games where the
core is the unique stable set of the game e g  Shapley  Peleg a Einy
Holzman Monderer and Shitovitz  and Biswas Parthasarathy and Ravindran
	

 
 
This paper is the rst study of stable sets in matching markets  In a matching
market there are two disjoint sets of agents usually called men and women or workers
and rms and we face the problem of matching agents from one side of the market
with agents from the other side where each individual has the possibility of remaining
unmatched  Matching problems arise in a number of important economic environ
ments such as entrylevel labor markets college admissions or school choice  The
literature on twosided matching problems focuses almost exclusively on the core 

However the core may violate external stability i e  there may be matchings outside
the core which are not blocked or objected by a coalition through a core matching 
Those matchings are only blocked through some hypothetical matching which does
not belong to the core  Once such a matching is proposed it is not clear why it will
be replaced by an element in the core  We show that a sucient condition for this is
that at the core matching which is optimal for one side of the market the agents of
that side can gain by reallocating their partners 
Here our purpose is not to investigate when the core is the unique stable set for
a matching problem  However the answer to this question will be a straightforward
corollary of our main result  We nd that any stable set shares a number of well
known and extensively studied properties of the core of a matching problem  Our
main result shows that for onetoone matching problems any stable set is a maximal
set satisfying the following properties a the core is a subset of the set b the set
is a lattice and c the set of unmatched agents is identical for any two matchings
belonging to the set  The converse also holds i e  a set is a stable set for a onetoone
 
Note that the core of a cooperative game is always unique 

Two of the few exceptions are Klijn and Masso  and Echenique and Oviedo a who
apply the bargaining set of Zhou  to matching problems 

matching problem  if a set is the unique maximal set satisfying the properties a 
b  and c  The literature on matching studied extensively when the core is a lattice
and when the set of unmatched agents is identical However there is no such result
saying that if a set possesses certain properties then it coincides with the core From
our main result it is immediate that the core is the unique stable set if and only if it
is a maximal set satisfying b  the set is a lattice and c  the set of unmatched agents
is identical for all matchings belonging to the set Furthermore our main result
facilitates considerably the search for stable sets in onetoone matching problems
we just need to look at maximal sets satisfying a  b  and c  and if the maximal
set is unique then it is a stable set  We also show that the main result does not
extend to manytoone matching problems
Two papers in the literature on stable sets contain some similar features as our
paper One is Einy Holzman Monderer and Shitovitz   who study nonatomic 
glove games with a continuum of agents They show that the core is the unique stable
set of any glove game where the mass of agents holding left hand and right hand gloves
is identical Glove games are a special case of assignment games where there are two
disjoint sets of buyers and sellers and each buyerseller pair obtains a certain surplus
from exchanging the good owned by the seller Note that their result requires a
continuum of agents an equal mass of sellers and traders and each seller	s good has
the same value for all buyers Our main result does not impose any restriction on
the onetoone matching problem under consideration The other paper is Einy and
Shitovitz 
  who study neoclassical pure exchange economies with a nite set
of agents or with a continuum of agents They show that the set of symmetric and
Paretooptimal allocations is the unique symmetric stable set Their result holds in
the continuum case without any restriction and in the nite case with the restriction
that any endowment is owned by an identical number of agents and the agents owning
the same endowment have identical preferences The spirit of their result is similar
as ours in the sense of determining properties of stable sets and showing that any set

satisfying these properties is a stable set  Note however that they focus on symmetric
stable sets only and for the nite case the result only holds if any endowment is owned
by an identical number of agents who have identical preferences 
 
Symmetry is not
meaningful in matching problems because no pair of agents is identical 
The paper is organized as follows  Section  introduces onetoone matching prob
lems  Section  denes stable sets and states some helpful insights  Section  contains
the main result for onetoone matching problems  It characterizes stable sets in terms
of wellknown properties of the core  Section  shows that this characterization does
not extend to manytoone matching problems  Section  concludes 
  OneToOne Matching Problems
A onetoone matching problem is a triple 	M W R
 where M is a nite set of men
W is a nite set of women and R is a preference prole specifying for each man
m   M a strict preference relation R
m
over W  fmg and for each woman w   W
a strict preference relation R
w
over M  fwg  Then vR
i
v
 
means that v is weakly
preferred to v
 
under R
i
 and vP
i
v
 
means v is strictly preferred to v
 
under R
i
 
Strictness of a preference relation R
i
means that vR
i
v
 
implies v  v
 
or vP
i
v
 
  We
will keep M and W xed and thus a matching problem is completely described by
R  Let R denote the set of all proles  We will call N  M W the set of agents 
Given R
m
and S  W  let R
m
jS denote the restriction of R
m
to S  Furthermore
let A	R
m

 denote the set of women who are acceptable for man m under R
m
 i e 
A	R
m

  fw   W jwP
m
mg  Similarly we dene R
w
jS 	where S M
 and A	R
w

 
A matching is a function   N  N satisfying the following properties 	i
 for
all m   M   	m
   W  fmg 	ii
 for all w   W   	w
   M  fwg and 	iii
 for all
i   N   	 	i

  i  Let M denote the set of all matchings  We say that an agent i
is unmatched at matching  if 	i
  i  Let U	
 denote the set of agents who are
 
This assumption is similar to the one of Einy  Holzman  Monderer  and Shitovitz  that an
equal mass of agents holds left hand and right hand gloves

unmatched at    Given a prole R a matching   is called individually rational if for
all i   N   iR
i
i and   is called Pareto optimal if there is no matching  
 
   such
that  
 
iR
i
 i for all i   N with strict preference holding for at least one agent 
Given a coalition S  N  we say that matching  
 
Pareto dominates for S matching
  if  
 
iR
i
 i for all i   S with strict preference holding for at least one agent in
S  We say that   is Pareto optimal for S if there is no matching  
 
   such that
matching  
 
Pareto dominates for S matching    Furthermore we say that matching
  is attainable for coalition S if  S  S where  S  f iji   Sg 
Let R be a prole  Given two matchings    
 
and a coalition S  N  we say that
  dominates  
 
via S under R denoted by   
R
S
 
 
 if i  S  S and ii for all
i   S  iP
i
 
 
i  We say that S blocks  
 
if   
R
S
 
 
for some matching    We say
that   dominates  
 
under R denoted by   
R
 
 
 if there exists S  N such that
  
R
S
 
 
  We omit the superscript when R is unambiguous and write 
S
and  
The core of a matching problem contains all matchings which are not blocked by
some coalition  Given a prole R let CR denote the core of R
 
i e 
CR  f    Mj for all   S  N and all  
 
  M we have  
 

R
S
 g
The core of a matching problem is always nonempty Gale and Shapley 	
 and
the set of unmatched agents is identical for all matchings in the core McVitie and
Wilson 	  We also consider the core where blocking is only allowed by a certain
set of coalitions instead of all coalitions  Given a set of coalitions T  let C
T
R
denote the T core of R Kalai Postlewaite and Roberts 		 i e 
C
T
R  f    Mj for all S   T and all  
 
  M we have  
 

R
S
 g
It is wellknown that the core of a matching problem is a complete lattice Knuth
	
 attributes this result to John Conway 

Therefore the core contains two
 
The core of a one to one matching problem is often referred to as the set of stable matchings
In avoiding any confusion with stable sets we will not use this terminology

Many papers study the lattice structure of the core and the set of stable matchings in matching


matchings  called the M optimal matching and the W optimal matching the two
extremes of the lattice  such that the M optimal matching is the matching which is
both most preferred by the men and least preferred by the women in the core similar
for the W optimal matching
Given a prole R  let  
M
denote the M optimal matching and  
W
the W optimal
matching in CR Given two matchings    
 
  M  let     
 
denote the mapping
    
 
 N  N such that i for all m   M       
 
m   m if  mR
m
 
 
m 
and otherwise     
 
m   
 
m  and ii for all w   W       
 
m   w if
 
 
wR
w
 w  and otherwise     
 
w   
 
w Note that     
 
does not need to
be a matching Similarly we dene     
 
 Given a prole R and V  M  we say
that V is a lattice under R if for all    
 
  V we have     
 
  V and     
 
  V 
  Stable Sets
A set of matchings is a stable set for a matching problem if it satises the following
two robustness conditions i no matching inside the set is dominated by a matching
belonging to the set and ii any matching outside the set is dominated by a matching
belonging to the set
De nition  Let R   R and V  M  Then V is called a stable set for R if the
following two properties hold
i Internal stability For all    
 
  V      
 
 
ii External stability For all  
 
  MnV there exists     V such that     
 
 
Since the core consists of all undominated matchings  the core is always contained
in any stable set However  the core is not necessarily a stable set A su	cient
condition for the core not to be a stable set is that at the M optimal matching the
men can gain by reallocating their partners and thus  the M optimal matching is
problems  see for example Blair  Alkan  Alkan and Gale 	 and Echenique and
Oviedo 
b


not Pareto optimal for the men By symmetry of course the parallel result holds
for the women and the W  optimal matching
Proposition   Let R be a pro le If there exists an individually rational matching
  which Pareto dominates for M the Moptimal matching  
M
 then the core of R is
not a stable set for R
Proof Let   be an individually rational matching which Pareto dominates for M
the matching  
M
 Then we have for all m   M   mR
m
 
M
m with strict pref 
erence holding for at least one man Obviously by the individual rationality of  
M

this implies that any man who is matched to a woman at  
M
must be also matched
to a woman at   ie  m   W for all m   M such that  
M
m  m Thus by
 
M
  CR and the individual rationality of   we must have  MW   
M
MW
and that the set of unmatched agents is identical for both   and  
M
 Since the set
of unmatched agents is the same at any two matchings belonging to the core and
U   U 
M
 we have U   U 
 
 for all  
 
  CR Now if there were a
 
 
  CR such that  
 
   then by U   U 
 
  
 

fm wg
  for some man woman
pair fmwg Thus  
 
mP
m
 m which is impossible because  mR
m
 
M
m and
 
M
is the matching which is most preferred by all men in CR ie  
M
mR
m
 
 
m
Hence there is no matching  
 
  CR such that  
 
   and CR is not externally
stable  
The following example is a matching problem where the core is not a stable set
even though itsM  optimal matching is Pareto optimal for the men and itsW  optimal
matching is Pareto optimal for the women Hence the example shows that the reverse
conclusion of Proposition  is not true ie if the M  optimal matching is Pareto 
optimal for the men and its W  optimal matching is Pareto optimal for the women
then the core is a stable set
Example   Let M  fm
 
 m
 
 m

 m

 m

 m

g and W  fw

 w
 
 w

 w

 w

 w

g

Let R   R be such that  for each agent i   N we specify R
i
jA R
i
 only
R
m
 
R
m

R
m

R
m

R
m

R
m

R
w
 
R
w

R
w

R
w

R
w

R
w

w
 
w
 
w

w

w

w

m

m

m

m

m
 
m

w

w

w

w

w
 
w

m

m

m

m

m

m

w

w

w

m

m

m

m

w

w

w

m

m
 
m

w

Then
 
M

 

m

m

m

m

m
 
m

w

w
 
w

w

w

w


A

and
 
W

 

m

m

m

m

m
 
m

w

w

w

w

w
 
w


A

Obviously  
M
is Paretooptimal for M and  
W
is Paretooptimal for W  Let
  
 

m

m

m

m

m
 
m

w

w

w

w

w
 
w


A

Note that   is obtained from  
W
when m

and m

exchange their assigned women
w

and w

 Then     C R because  m

 w

 blocks   Note that  m

 w

 is the
only manwoman pair blocking   Thus if there is some     C R such that     
then we must have   
fm

 w
 
g
  and   m

  w

 However this is impossible ie
for all     C R we have   m

  w



Therefore for all     C R we have     
 
To see this  suppose  m

  w

for some     CR Then m

 w

 cannot block    which
implies  m

  w

 Since  
M
w

  m

   
W
w

  m

   
M
is the worst stable matching for
the women in CR  and  
W
is the best stable matching for the women in CR  we must have
 w

   fm

m

g Thus  by  m

  w

  we obtain  w

  m

and  m

  w

 Similarly 
 
M
m

  w

and  
W
m

  w

imply  m

   fw

 w

g Since  m

  w

  we must have
 m

  w

 Hence   fm

m

g  fw

 w

g From w

P
m
 
w

  w

P
m

w

  and     CR we obtain
 m

  w

and  m

  w

 But then m

 w

 blocks    which contradicts     CR

and C R is not stable for R even though  
M
is Paretooptimal for M and  
W
is
Paretooptimal for W   
Furthermore stable sets are not necessarily individually rational  the same is true
for other cooperative games
Example   Let M  fm
 
 m
 
 m

g and W  fw

 w
 
 w

g Let R  R be such that
R
m
 
R
m

R
m

R
w
 
R
w

R
w

w

w
 
w

m
 
m

m

w
 
w

w

m

m

m
 
m

m
 
m

w

w
 
w

w

w

w
 
m

m
 
m

Let   
 

m

m
 
m

w

w
 
w


A
  
 

 

m

m
 
m

w
 
w

w


A
 and  
  

 

m

m
 
m

w

w

w
 

A

Then C R  f 
 
g It is a direct consequence of our main result  we will state
Theorem  in the next section that V  f   
 
  
  
g is the unique stable set for R  
Because of the bilateral structure of onetoone matching problems the essential
blocking coalitions are manwoman pairs and individuals Therefore with any set
of matchings we may associate the manwoman pairs which are matched by some
element belonging to this set and the individuals who are unmatched under some
element belonging to this set Given V M let
T  V   ffi   ig j i  N and    V g
The following is a simple and useful characterization of stable sets  This was already
noted by von Neumann and Morgenstern  		
Theorem  Let R be a pro le and V M Then V is a stable set for R if and only
if V  C
T V 
 R


Proof   Only if Let V be a stable set for R By internal stability of V we have
V   C
T  V 
 R Suppose V  C
T  V 
 R Let    C
T  V 
 RnV  But then by denition
of T  V  there is no    V such that      which contradicts external stability of
V 
 If Let V  C
T  V 
 R By denition of T  V  V is internally stable Let   
MnV  Then there is    V such that      and V is externally stable  
  The Main Result
First we show the following useful insight if a matching is not dominated by any
matching belonging to the core then the set of unmatched agents is identical for this
matching and any matching belonging to the core Because any stable set contains
the core and is internally stable Proposition  implies that the set of unmatched
agents is identical for any two matchings belonging to a stable set
Proposition  Let R be a pro le and    MnC R If for all    C R     
then the set of unmatched agents is identical for   and for all matchings in C R
Proof  Since the set of unmatched agents is identical for any two matchings be	
longing to C R it su
ces to show U    U  
W

First suppose that there is m  M such that   m  m and  
W
 m  m Let
 
W
 m  w Since  
W
is individually rational we have  
W
 mP
m
m Thus from
 
W

fm wg
  we obtain   wP
w
 
W
 w Hence   w  w Let   w  m
 
 If
 
W
 m
 
  m
 
 then by  
W

fm
 
g
  we must have   m
 
P
m
 
m
 
 But then  m
 
 w
blocks  
W
 ie   
fm
 
 wg
 
W
 which is a contradiction to  
W
 C R Therefore we
must have  
W
 m
 
  m
 
 Thus by m
 
P
w
 
W
 w   w  m
 
 and  
W
 C R we
have  
W
 m
 
P
m
 
  m
 
 Let  
W
 m
 
  w
 
 Then again by  
W

fm
 
 w
 
g
  we must have
  w
 
P
w
 
 
W
 w
 
 Continuing this way we nd an innite sequence of men and women
which contradicts the niteness of M W  Hence we have shown that if a man is

unmatched at   then he is also unmatched at all matchings belonging to CR Since
the same argumentation is also valid for women we obtain U    U 
W

Second suppose that there is m M such that  m  m and  
W
m  m Be
cause  
W

fmg
  we must have  mP
m
m Let  m  w Then by  
W
 CR we
have   
fm wg
 
W
 Thus by  mP
m
m we have  
W
wP
w
m Because  
W

fwg
 
w cannot be unmatched at  
W
 Thus  
W
w  w Let  
W
w  m
 
 Again from
 
W

fm
 
 wg
  and  
W
wP
w
 w we obtain  m
 
P
m
 
 
W
m
 
 Thus  m
 
  m
 
 Let
 m
 
  w
 
 Then by  
W
 CR and  m
 
P
m
 
 
W
m
 
 we have  
W
w
 
P
w
 
 w
 

Continuing this way we nd an innite sequence of men and women which contra
dicts the niteness of M W  Hence we have shown that if a man is unmatched
at all matchings belonging to CR then he is also unmatched at   Since the same
argumentation is also valid for women we obtain U   U 
W
  
Next we show that if V is a stable set for R then it is also a stable set for
the prole where all agents in the opposite set become acceptable without changing
any preferences between them for any agent who is matched under the core and
no agent is acceptable for all agents who are unmatched under the core Therefore
the individual rationality constraint is irrelevant for the matched agents and when
investigating stable sets we may constrain ourselves to onetoone matching problems
which contain the same number of men and women and any agent ranks all members
belonging to the opposite set acceptable
Proposition   Let R be a pro le    CR and V  M Let

R be such that i for
all i  U  A

R
i
   ii for all m MnU  A

R
m
 W and

R
m
jW  R
m
jW 
and iii for all w  WnU  A

R
w
  M and

R
w
jM  R
w
jM  Then V is a stable
set for R if and only if V is a stable set for

R
Proof Only if Let V be a stable set for R By Theorem 	 it su
ces to show
V  C
T  V 


R
	
Since V is a stable set for R  we have CR   V  Thus  by internal stability of
V under R and Proposition   we have for all  
 
 V   U 
 
  U  Note that the
construction of

R does not change any preferences of R
i
between any partners for any
agent i  NnU  Hence  by internal stability of V under R and U 
 
  U  for
all  
 
 V   we have V   C
T  V 


R Suppose V  C
T  V 


R Let    C
T  V 


RnV 
Then for all  
 
 V    
 


R
  Thus  by CR   V and Proposition   U   U 
Hence  by construction of

R  we have for all  
 
 V    
 

R
   and V is not externally
stable under R  a contradiction
If Let V be a stable set for

R By Theorem   it suces to show V  C
T  V 
R
By the stability of V under

R  C

R   V  Let    C

R By construction of

R  we
have CR   C

R Since the set of unmatched agents is identical for all matchings
belonging to C

R and    CR   C

R  we have U   U  By internal stability
of V under

R and Proposition   we have for all  
 
 V   U 
 
  U   U  Hence 
by construction of

R from R and internal stability of V under

R  V   C
T  V 
R Sup	
pose V  C
T  V 
R Let 
   C
T  V 
RnV  Since CR   V   we then have for all
 
 
 CR   
 

R

   and by Proposition   U
   U  But then by construction
of

R from R   
 


R

  for all  
 
 V   and V is not externally stable under

R  a
contradiction  
Proposition  is a strategic equivalence result in the sense that any stable set
for a prole R is also a stable set for the prole

R where all core	unmatched agents
rank all partners unacceptable and all core	matched agents rank all possible partners
acceptable This fact also implies that the core of

R must be contained in any stable
set for R

Our main result is the following characterization of stable sets
Theorem   Let R be a pro le and V  M Then V is a stable set for R only if V
is a maximal set satisfying the following properties
 
However  the core of

R is not necessarily a stable set for R

 a C R   V 
 b V is a lattice
 c The set of unmatched agents is identical for all matchings belonging to V 
Furthermore V is a stable set for R if V is the unique maximal set satisfying prop
erties  a  b and  c
Proof   Only if Let V be a stable set for R First we show that V satises  a
 b and  c By external stability of V  we have C R   V and V satises  a
Let T  ffi   ig j i  N and   V g By Theorem  V  C
T
 R For all
i  N  let T  i  f i j  V gnfig Let

R  R be such that  i for all m  M 

R
m
jT  m  R
m
jT  m and for allw  T  m and all w
 
 WnT  m w

P
m
m

P
m
w
 
 and
 ii for all w  W 

R
w
jT  w  R
w
jT  w and for allm  T  w and allm
 
MnT  w
m

P
w
w

P
w
m
 

We show that from the construction of

R it follows that C 

R  C
T
 R Let
  C 

R If   C
T
 R then there exists some S  T and   M such that  
R
S

Since T  T  V  and V is stable for R we may assume   V  C
T
 R Because
 is individually rational under

R  is also individually rational under R Thus if
 
R
S
 then S  fm wg for some manwoman pair Then by the construction
of

R and   V  we also have  
 
R
S
 which contradicts   C 

R Hence we
have C 

R   C
T
 R In showing the reverse inclusion relation let   C
T
 R If
  C 

R then there exists some   S   N and   M such that  
 
R
S
 Since the
matching problem is onetoone the essential blocking coalitions are only individuals
and manwoman pairs Thus we may assume that S is a singleton or a manwoman
pair By the construction of

R there exists a matching 	  V such that 	 S   S
From the construction of

R then we also have 	 
R
S
 This contradicts the internal
stability of V because   	  V and C
T
 R  V  Hence we have C 

R  C
T
 R
We know that C 

R is a lattice Because the preferences restricted to C 

R are
identical under R and

R and V  C 

R we have that V is a lattice under R and V
satises  b Furthermore the set of unmatched agents is identical for all matchings


belonging to C 

R Since V  C 

R V satises  c
Second we show that V is a maximal set satisfying  a  b and  c Suppose
not Because V satises  a  b and  c then there exists a set V
 
  M satisfying
 a  b and  c such that V   V
 
and V
 
 V  Let    V
 
nV  By external stability
of V there exists    V such that      Because V   V
 
and V
 
satises  c the
set of unmatched agents is identical for   and   Thus by      we must have
  
fm wg
  for some manwoman pair  mw Hence   m  w   m  m   w 
w wP
m
  m and mP
w
  w Now when calculating     we obtain      m  w
and     w    w By   w  m    is not a matching which is a contradiction
to V
 
 M and V
 
being a lattice
 If Let V be the unique maximal set satisfying  a  b and  c We prove that V
is a stable set for R First we show that V is internally stable Let      V  By  c
the set of unmatched agents is identical for   and   Thus if      then   
fm wg
 
for some manwoman pair  mw ie   m  w wP
m
  m and mP
w
  w Then
similarly as above it follows that     is not a matching a contradiction to V being
a lattice
Second we show that V is externally stable Suppose not Then there is some
   MnV such that for all    V       By C R   V   c and Proposition 	 the
set of unmatched agents is identical for   and all matchings belonging to V 
Let T  ffi   ig j i  N and    C R  f gg For all i  N  let T  i 
f  i j   C R  f ggnfig Let

R  R be such that  i for all m M 

R
m
jT  m 
R
m
jT  m and for all w  T  m and all w
 
 WnT  m w

P
m
m

P
m
w
 
 and  ii for
all w  W 

R
w
jT  w  R
w
jT  w and for all m  T  w and all m
 
 MnT  w
m

P
w
w

P
w
m
 
 By construction C R  f g   C 

R We know that C 

R is a lattice
under

R Furthermore for all    C 

R and all i  N    i  T  ifig Because the
preferences restricted to C 

R are identical under

R and R it follows that C 

R is
a lattice for R By construction C 

R  C R Furthermore the set of unmatched
agents is identical for all matchings belonging to C 

R Hence C 

R is a set of


matchings satisfying  a  b and  c
Because M is nite there exists a maximal set V
 
  C 

R such that V
 
satises
 a  b and  c Then V
 
is a maximal set satisfying  a  b and  c and    V
 
nV 
which contradicts the fact that V is the unique maximal set satisfying  a  b and
 c Hence V must be externally stable  
Remark   It is straightforward to check that properties  a  b and  c are mutu
ally independent in Theorem 
 
Let M 	 fm

 m

g and W 	 fw

 w

g
  b 
  c   a Let R be a prole and  
I
denote the matching such that
 
I
 i 	 i for all i  N  Then f 
I
g is a  maximal set satisfying  b and  c
Whenever C R 	 f 
I
g the set f 
I
g violates  a
  a 
  c   b LetR be the prole such that w

P
m
 
w

P
m
 
m

 w

P
m

w

P
m

m


m

P
w
 
m

P
w
 
w

 andm

P
w

m

P
w

w

 Let   	
 

m

m

w

w


A
and  
 
	
 

m

m

w

w


A

Then C R 	 f g and f   
 
g is a  maximal set satisfying  a and  c Since
    
 
is not a matching the set f   
 
g violates  b
  a 
  b   c LetR be the prole such thatm

P
m
 
w

P
m
 
w

m

P
m

w

P
m

w


m

P
w
 
w

P
w
 
m

 and w

P
w

m

P
w

m

 Let  
  
	
 

m

m

w

m

A
 Then C R 	
f 
I
g and f 
I
  
  
g is a  maximal set satisfying  a and  b  where  
I
is dened
as above Obviously the set f 
I
  g violates  c
An important consequence of Theorem  is that any stable set contains a matching
which is both most preferred by the men and least preferred by the women in the
stable set This is due to the fact that by  b any stable set is a lattice ie the
preferences of men and women are opposed for the matchings belonging to a stable
set Furthermore the stability of a set implies that the matching which is most
 
Note that the core of R satis es a b and c but it may not be a maximal set satisfying
these properties

preferred by the men in the stable set  is not Pareto dominated for the men by any
individually rational matching Therefore  this matching is Paretooptimal for the
men if all agents in the opposite set are acceptable for any agent
Corollary   Let R be a pro le Then any stable set V for R contains a matching
which is both most preferred by the men and least preferred by the women in V  namely
 
  V
  and V contains a matching which is both least preferred by the men and most
preferred by the women in V  namely 
  V
 
Note that if V is the unique maximal set satisfying a  b  and c of Theorem
  then V is the unique stable set for R An immediate corollary of our main result
is the answer to the question when the core is the unique stable set for a onetoone
matching problem
Corollary  Let R be a pro le The core CR is the unique stable set for R if and
only if CR is a maximal set satisfying b the set is a lattice and c the set of
unmatched agents is identical for all matchings belonging to the set
Proof Only if If CR is a stable set for R  then by Theorem   CR is a maximal
set satisfying a  b  and c Hence  CR is a maximal set satisfying b and c
If If CR is a maximal set satisfying b and c of Theorem   then CR is
the unique maximal set satisfying a  b  and c of Theorem  Hence  by Theorem
  CR is the unique stable set for R  
The following example shows that for the stability of a set V it is not sucient
for V to be a maximal set satisfying properties a  b  and c in Theorem 
Furthermore  for the stability of a set V it is not necessary for V to be the unique
maximal set satisfying properties a  b  and c in Theorem 
Example  Let M  fm
 
 m
 
 m

 m

g and W  fw

 w
 
 w

 w

g Let R  R be

such that
R
m
 
R
m

R
m

R
m

R
w
 
R
w

R
w

R
w

w
 
w

w

w

m

m
 
m

m

w

w
 
w

w

m

m

m

m

w

w

w
 
w
 
m
 
m

m
 
m
 
w

w

w

w

m

m

m

m

m

m
 
m

m

w

w
 
w

w

Let    
 

m

m
 
m

m

w

w
 
w

w


A
  
 
 
 

m

m
 
m

m

w
 
w

w

w


A
 and
 
  
 
 

m

m
 
m

m

w

w
 
w

w


A
 Then CR   f g Let V   f   
 
g and V
 
  f   
  
g
Note that   is Pareto dominated for the men via both  
 
and  
  
and that no other
matching Pareto dominates for the men   Thus any matching  
   
 Mnf   
 
  
  
g
is dominated by   ie     
   


Furthermore  
 

fm

 w
 
g
 
  
and  
  
  
 
 Hence
we have i V is a stable set for R because  
 
  
  
and for all  
   
 Mnf   
 
  
  
g
    
   
and ii V
 
is a maximal set satisfying properties a b and c in Theorem
 but V
 
is not a stable set for R because     
 
and  
  
  
 
 
Remark   The ifpart of Theorem  is one of very few results saying that if a set
possesses certain properties then it is a stable set or the core Characterizations
of the core as a solution for all problems have been obtained via properties relating
dierent problems For example consistency	 plays the important role in the char
acterizations of the core of Sasaki and Toda 
 for onetoone matching problems
and of Peleg 
b for cooperative games

In Theorem  all properties apply only
to a single problem
  
Since  
   
   
 
and  
   
   
  
  
   
cannot Pareto dominate   for the men Thus by  
   
    there
is some m
i
M such that  
   
m
i
   w
i
and w
i
P
m
i
 
   
m
i
 Then   dominates  
   
via fm
i
 w
i
g

In these contexts Demange  	nds a certain 
strong stability condition of the core which
is sucient for the core to be nonmanipulable by agents who evaluate any set of outcomes in terms
of its most preferred element


Remark   Some literature studies only stable sets which are individually rational 
Then the denition of stable sets needs to be adjusted by requiring external stability
for individually rational matchings only  It can be checked that Theorem  remains
unchanged if we restrict ourselves to individually rational matchings 
  ManyToOne Matching Problems
It is a typical feature that results for onetoone matching problems do not extend
to manytoone matching problems 
  
We will show that this also applies to most
of our results  Instead of introducing the formal manytoone matching model we
will use the reverse version of the ingenious trick by Gale and Sotomayor 	
and only consider onetoone matching problems and associate with it if possible	 a
manytoone matching problem with responsive preferences  For all our examples it
su
ces to consider the possibility of merging two men say m

and m
 
 to one agent 
Given a onetoone matching problem M W R	 we say that M W R	 corresponds
to a manytoone matching problem where m

and m
 
are merged to fm

  m
 
g if i	
R
m
 
jW  R
m

jW and AR
m
 
	  AR
m

	 the preferences of m

and m
 
are identical	
and ii	 for all w   W  m

P
w
m
 
and there is no v  M  fwg such that m

P
w
vP
w
m
 
each woman ranks m

above m
 
and the positions of m

and m
 
in the womans
ranking are adjacent to each other	  In the corresponding problem fm

  m
 
g can
be matched with up to two women and their preference R
 
fm
 
 m

g
is responsive to
R
m
 
over the sets containing fewer than or equal to two women i e  for all distinct
w w

  w

  W 
fw w

gP
 
fm
 
 m

g
fw w

g  w

P
m
 
w


  
This has been shown already for manipulation issues and that with substitutable preferences
the set of unmatched agents may change for matchings in the core  Martinez Masso Neme and
Oviedo 

It is easy to see that Theorem   remains true for manytoone matching problems
and that in general the following implications hold i V is internally stable in the
onetoone matching problem  V is internally stable in the corresponding manyto
one matching problem and ii V is externally stable in the corresponding manyto
one matching problem  V is externally stable in the onetoone matching problem
However the reverse directions of these statements are not true in general There does
not need to be any relationship between the stable sets of the onetoone matching
problem and its corresponding manytoone matching problem ie i V is a stable
set in the onetoone matching problem   V is a stable set in the corresponding
manytoone matching problem and ii V is a stable set in the corresponding many
toone matching problem   V is a stable set in the onetoone matching problem
Furthermore in the corresponding manytoone matching problem a stable set may
not be a lattice and the set of unmatched agents may not be identical for all matchings
belonging to a stable set Thus Proposition  and Theorem  do not carry over to
manytoone matching problems The following example establishes these facts
Example   Let M  fm
 
  m
 
  m

g and W  fw

  w
 
  w

  w

g Let R  R be such
that
R
m
 
R
m

R
m

R
w
 
R
w

R
w

R
w

w

w

w
 
m

m

m

m

w
 
w
 
w

m

m
 
m
 
m
 
w

w

w

m
 
m

m

m

w

w

w

w

w
 
w

w

m

m
 
m

Let  
 

m

m
 
m

w

w
 
w

w

w


A
and 
 

 

m

m
 
m

w

w

w

w
 
w


A
 Then CR  fg
and f  
 
g is the unique maximal set satisfying properties a b and c of Theorem
 Hence f  
 
g is the unique stable set for the onetoone matching problem
	
Now consider the corresponding many to one matching problem where we merge
m
 
andm
 
to one agent denoted by fm

  m
 
g note that this is possible since R
m
 
and
R
m

agree over the set of women and each woman ranksm

andm
 
adjacent and in the
same order Let  
 

m

m
 
m

w

w
 
w

w

w


A
 
 

 

m

m
 
m

w

w

w

w
 
w


A
 and 
  

 

m

m
 
m

w

w

w

w
 
w


A
 Then in the corresponding many to one matching problem
  
ffm
 
 m

g w

 w

g
 since m

and m
 
are merged to one agent and w
 
is indierent
between  and  and 
 
 
ffm
 
 m

g w
 
 w

g
 since w

prefers m

to m

 Thus    
and 
 
   which implies that f  
 
g is not externally stable in the corresponding
many to one matching problem Let V  f  
 
    
 
  
  
g Without loss of generality
let fw

  w

gP

fm
 
 m

g
w

P

fm
 
 m

g
w
 
 It is easy to check that V is a stable set for R
in the corresponding many to one matching problem if fw

  w

gR

fm
 
 m

g
fw
 
  w

g if
fw
 
  w

gP

fm
 
 m

g
fw

  w

g then  
ffm
 
 m

g w

 w

g

 
and f  
 
    
  
g is a stable set
for R

Hence we have established the following facts
i In the one to one matching problem f  
 
g is a stable set for R and V is not
a stable set for R because V is not internally stable
ii In the corresponding many to one matching problem V is a stable set for R
and f  
 
g is not a stable set for R because f  
 
g is not externally stable
iii In the corresponding many to one matching problem V is a stable set for R
The set of unmatched agents is not identical for any two matchings belonging
  
To see this  let     MnV  If  m
 
   fm
 
 w
 
 w

g  then   
fm
 
 w

g
  If  w

  w

  then
 
 

fm
 
 w

g
  If two or more women are unmatched under    then by  w

  w

  two women
out of fw

 w
 
 w

g are unmatched Since  m
 
   fw

 w

g  the merged agent fm

m

g is matched
to at most one woman and by fw
 
 w

gP

fm

 m

g
w

  it follows that   is dominated by a matching
in V because  
 
fm

m

g  fw

 w
 
g   
 
fm

m

g  fw

 w

g  and  
  
fm

m

g  fw
 
 w

g
Now it follows that i if  m
 
  w

  then     f 
 
  
 
  
  
g  V  and ii if  m
 
  w

  then    
f   g  V or  fm

m

g  fw
 
 w

g which is not possible because we cannot have  w

  w


Hence  V is externally stable It is straightforward that V is internally stable
	

to V since U    fw
 
g   fw
 
g  U   Furthermore all women strictly
prefer being matched with any man to being unmatched Since under      all
women choose their most preferred partner from   and   and U  U    
under      no woman can be unmatched which is impossible because there
are only three man Hence      is not a matching and V is not a lattice
Thus Proposition  and Theorem  do not carry over to manytoone matching
problems 
It is straightforward to check that the conclusions of Example  are independent
of which responsive extension we choose for fm

 m

g
Recall that a matching is dominated by another matching via a coalition only if
all members of the coalition strictly prefer the other matching to the initial matching
The literature also refers to  as the strong dominance relation among matchings
The weak dominance relation allows some members of the blocking coalition to be
indi	erent between the initial and the new matching It is well known that results for
manytoone matching problems change when considering weak dominance instead
of strong dominance For onetoone matching problems this distinction is irrelevant
since agents
 preferences are strict and the problem is onetoone Therefore all
results remain identical under either dominance relation The same is true for most
cooperative games like games with transferable utility or with nontransferable utility
Since for onetoone matching problems it is irrelevant which dominance relation
we use one may wonder whether the conclusions of Example  remain true when
considering weak dominance To be more precise we introduce the weak dominance
relation Let R be a prole Given two matchings    
 
and a coalition S  N  we say
that   weakly dominates  
 
via S  under R denoted by   
w
S
 
 
 if  i   S  S  ii
for all i  S   iR
i
 
 
 i and  iii for some i  S   iP
i
 
 
 i We say that   weakly
dominates  
 
 under R denoted by   
w
 
 
 if there exists S  N such that   
w
S
 
 

We say that a set V is a strongly stable set for R if it satises conditions  i and  ii of
Denition  when  is replaced by 
w
 We will refer to  i as internal strong stability

and to  ii as external strong stability It is easy to see that in Example  the
set f   
 
g is a strongly stable set for R in the corresponding manytoone matching
problem Nevertheless as the following example shows there does not need to be
any relationship between the strongly stable sets of the onetoone matching problem
and its associated manytoone matching problem
Example   Let M  fm
 
 m
 
 m

 m

g and W  fw

 w
 
 w

g Let R   R be such
that
R
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R
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
R
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R
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
R
w
 
R
w

R
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w
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 
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 
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
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
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
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
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 
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
m

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
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 
m
 
w

w
 
w

Let   
 

m

m
 
m

m

w

m
 
w
 
w


A
 Then C R  f g and f g is the unique maximal
set satisfying properties  a  b and  c of Theorem  Hence C R is the unique
strongly stable set for the onetoone matching problem
Now consider the corresponding manytoone matching problem where we merge
m

and m
 
to one agent fm

 m
 
g and m

and m

to one agent fm

 m

g  note that
this is possible since the mens preferences agree over the set of women and each
woman ranks m

and m
 
adjacent and in the same order and m

and m

adjacent
and in the same order
Let fw
 
 w

gP
 
fm
 
 m

g
w

and w

P
 
fm

 m

g
fw
 
 w

g Let  


 

m

m
 
m

m

w
 
w

w

m


A

Then in the corresponding manytoone matching problem   
w
 

 which implies
that f g is not externally strongly stable in the corresponding manytoone matching
problem Let V  f   

g It is easy to check that V is a strongly stable set for R in
	
the corresponding many to one matching problem
  
Hence we have established the
following facts
i In the one to one matching problem f g is a strongly stable set for R and V
is not a strongly stable set for R because V is not internally strongly stable
ii In the corresponding many to one matching problem V is a strongly stable set
for R and f g is not a strongly stable set for R because f g is not externally
strongly stable

iii In the corresponding many to one matching problem V is a strongly stable set
for R The set of unmatched agents is not identical for any two matchings
belonging to V since U   fm

g   fm
 
g  U 
 
 Thus Proposition 
and Theorem  do not carry over to many to one matching problems when
considering the weak dominance relation 
w
 
  Conclusion
In general both the core and stable sets may not exist for cooperative games Lucas
	
	 and Einy and Shitovitz 		
 for stable sets Since the core of one to one
matching problems is always non empty one may wonder why we should be interested
in stable sets Such a judgement would be based on properties of solution concepts
ie such reasoning is a posteriori after having dened a solution concept However
more importantly any judgement of any solution concept should be a priori based
  
To see this  let     MnV  If  w

  w

  then  
 

w
ffm
 
 m

g w

g
  Let  w

  w


If w

   fm

m

g  then either      or   
w
ffm
 
 m

g w

 w
 
g
  Let w

   fm

m
 
g If
fw

g   fm

m
 
g  then either     
 
or  
 

w
ffm

 m

g w

 w
 
g
  If fw

g    fm

m
 
g  then
  
w
ffm

 m

g w

g
  Hence  V is externally strongly stable It is straightforward that V is internally
strongly stable

Note that V is not a stable set for R since for   
 

m

m

m

m
 
w

w

w

m
 

A
we have both     
and  
 
  

on the economic meaning of its de nition Any core matching is unblocked ie no
coalition has any incentive to deviate from it However the core as a set does not
possess any additional appealing property other than the stability of any single core
matching This is not true for a stable set since as a whole set it satis es internal
stability and external stability If we select a single matching from a stable set then
this matching is unlikely to be externally stable as a set unless all agents unanimously
agree which matching is most preferred among all matchings Stable sets should be
truly understood as a multivalued solution concept They are appealing for situations
where agents agree to choose a set of possible outcomes and the  nally chosen outcome
is enforced For example in school choice agents may be prohibited from changing
their partners chosen by the possible outcome Then it may be questionable to rule
out matchings which are not blocked by any possible enforceable outcome
Of course on a practical level the success of a solution concept depends on its
properties and its applicability For onetoone matching problems we found that the
core and stable sets share a number of wellknown properties Our main result did
not impose any restriction on the matching problem under consideration other than
it is onetoone
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